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Abstract
Graph neural network (GNN), as a powerful rep-
resentation learning model on graph data, attracts
much attention across various disciplines. How-
ever, recent studies show that GNN is vulnera-
ble to adversarial attacks. How to make GNN
more robust? What are the key vulnerabilities in
GNN? How to address the vulnerabilities and de-
fense GNN against the adversarial attacks? In this
paper, we propose DefNet, an effective adversar-
ial defense framework for GNNs. In particular, we
first investigate the latent vulnerabilities in every
layer of GNNs and propose corresponding strate-
gies including dual-stage aggregation and bottle-
neck perceptron. Then, to cope with the scarcity
of training data, we propose an adversarial con-
trastive learning method to train the GNN in a con-
ditional GAN manner by leveraging the high-level
graph representation. Extensive experiments on
three public datasets demonstrate the effectiveness
of DefNet in improving the robustness of popular
GNN variants, such as Graph Convolutional Net-
work and GraphSAGE, under various types of ad-
versarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Graph Neural Network (GNN) has received wide atten-
tion [Defferrard et al., 2016; Hamilton et al., 2017a; Velick-
ovic et al., 2017; Kipf and Welling, 2016; Li et al., 2015;
Gilmer et al., 2017] in the past few years. It extends the tradi-
tional neural networks for processing the data represented in
the graph domains including social networks, protein-protein
interaction network, information network, and et al. The goal
of GNN is to learn the representation of the graph, in the
node level or graph level, via a neural network consisting
of a neural encoding function and a decoding function. Be-
cause of its remarkable graph representation learning ability,
GNN has been explored in various real-world applications,
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such as physics system [Battaglia et al., 2016], financial sys-
tem [Liu et al., 2018], protein interface prediction [Fout et
al., 2017], and disease classification [Rhee et al., 2018].
However, recent studies [Dai et al., 2018; Zugner et al.,
2018] have found that GNNs can easily be compromised
by adversarial attacks. These adversarial attacks are often
stealthy and only require small perturbations (e.g., by adding
or dropping edges) of the graph structure and/or node features
to induce the GNNs to make incorrect predictions for some
specific nodes with high confidence. This makes it highly
risky for those aforementioned domains that GNN applied,
especially security or financial applications, because it could
potentially open the backdoor for the attackers.
Despite recent advances in adversarial attacks [Dai et al.,
2018; Zugner et al., 2018; Goodfellow et al., 2015], the
question of how to defend the GNN against the adversarial
attacks has not been satisfyingly addressed yet. Nonethe-
less, some works have been proposed to improve the robust-
ness of traditional Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) [Good-
fellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017; Na et al., 2017;
Samangouei et al., 2018; Papernot et al., 2016; Jia and Liang,
2017]. Among them, adversarial learning, which augments
the training data with adversarial examples during the train-
ing stage [Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017;
Na et al., 2017], has shown to be most effective in defend-
ing the powerful adversarial attacks [Athalye et al., 2018].
However, these defense works only focus on either image
data [Samangouei et al., 2018] or text data [Jia and Liang,
2017]. When it comes to adversarial defense in graph data,
where the graph structure and the nodes’ feature are often
discrete, there is no existing work. It is difficult to defend
the GNN against the adversarial attacks due to two major
challenges: (1) the latent vulnerabilities from every layer of
GNN and (2) the discrete adversarial space.
Naturally, the vulnerabilities of GNN can come from ev-
ery layer of its unique architecture: the aggregation layer and
the perceptron layer. As the main strength of GNN, the ag-
gregation layer computes the node representation by lever-
aging its context, which covers the graph structure. How-
ever, the aggregation layer can also be vulnerable due to the
effect that, the node representation depends not only on its
own feature but also on its neighborhood [Kipf and Welling,
2016]. [Zugner et al., 2018] has shown that the attack can be
conducted without touching of the target node, since the at-
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tack happening on the other neighbors may propagate to the
nodes that are not attacked. Another vulnerability is related to
the input dimension, which inherits from DNNs. As shown
in [Simon-Gabriel et al., 2018], there is a one-to-one rela-
tionship between the adversarial vulnerability and the input
dimension, such that the adversarial vulnerability increases
with the input dimension.
In addition to the lack of understanding of the vulnerabili-
ties, the discrete adversarial space is also an issue. Different
from images where the data are continuous, the graphs are
discrete and the combinatorial nature of the graph structures
makes it much more difficult than the text data. Thus, how
to generate good adversarial graph samples to augment the
training data for GNN is a non-trivial problem. Simply gen-
erating adversarial samples from a noise distribution will not
tailor toward the graph data. And the generated ineffectual
adversarial samples could even weaken the robustness of the
model against various adversarial attacks.
To tackle the aforementioned two challenges, in this paper,
we propose DefNet, an effective framework for defending
popular Graph Neural Networks against adversarial attacks.
DefNet consists of two modules: GER (Graph Encoder Re-
fining) and ACL (Adversarial Contrastive Learning). First,
GER investigates the vulnerabilities in the aggregation layer
and the perceptron layer of a GNN encoder, and applies dual-
stage aggregation and bottleneck perceptron to address those
vulnerabilities. Then, in ACL module, the GNN is trained
in an adversarial contrastive learning style. To overcome the
discrete adversarial space problem, ACL models the adver-
sarial learning as a conditional GAN by leveraging the high-
level graph representation as auxiliary information to regu-
larize the node representation learning. To evaluate the per-
formance of DefNet, we perform an extensive set of experi-
ments on three public graph datasets. The results demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed framework on defending the
popular GNN variants, such as Graph Convolutional Network
and GraphSAGE, against various types of adversarial attacks.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
In this paper, we use bold lowercase for vectors (e.g., a), bold
capital for matrices (e.g., A), and calligraphic letters for sets
(e.g., A). A graph is represented by a triplet G = (V, E ,X),
where V = {v1, ..., vn} is the set of nodes, E ⊆ V × V is the
set of edges, and X ∈ Rn×d is a matrix with the v-th row,
xv , representing the d-dimensional feature vector of node v.
Also, |V|= n and |E|= m are the number of nodes and edges
inG, respectively. Following the existing work on adversarial
attacks [Zugner et al., 2018], in this paper, we consider graphs
that are undirected and attributed.
A Graph Neural Network (GNN) is a function fGNN ,
parameterized by neural networks. Typically, fGNN is com-
posed of an encoding function ENC(·) and a decoding func-
tion DEC(·), such that fGNN (G) ≡ DEC(ENC(G)). In
particular, we have
hv = ENC(xv, {xu}u∈Nv ) (1)
ov = DEC(hv) (2)
where hv is the embedding vector of node v, ov is the de-
coded output, and Nv is the set of neighboring nodes of v in
graph G, i.e., Nv = {u|(u, v) ∈ E , (v, u) ∈ E}.
The encoding function is characterized by an aggregation
layer and a perceptron layer [Hamilton et al., 2017b]. The ag-
gregation layer aims to aggregate the neighborhood informa-
tion of a node for updating its embedding, which encourages
message propagation along the graph. Formally, the aggrega-
tion function is defined as follows:
a(k)v = AGG({h(k−1)u }u∈Nv ) (3)
where a(k)v is the aggregated representation of the neighbor-
ing embeddings h(k−1)u (at the (k − 1)-th layer) of node v.
After obtaining a(k)v , the perceptron layer transforms it to a
hidden nonlinear space to reach an updated embedding, h(k)v ,
of node v by performing:
h(k)v = PERCE(a
(k)
v ) (4)
Depending on different tasks, the parameters of fGNN can
be trained in a supervised or unsupervised manner. For exam-
ple, considering node classification, each node v has a label
yv ∈ Y = {1, 2, ..., Y }. Then, the loss function can be de-
fined using the decoding function DEC(·) and Softmax:
` =
1
N
∑
v∈V
Softmax(DEC(hv), yv) (5)
In an unsupervised scenario, a cross-entropy loss can be
used to encourage similarities between nearby nodes and dif-
ference between disparate nodes [Hamilton et al., 2017a]:
` = log(σ(hTuhv)) +
K∑
n=1
Evn∼Pn(v) log(σ(−hTvnhv)) (6)
where u ∈ Nv is a neighbor of v, Pn(v) is the noise distri-
bution for negative sampling, K is the number of negative
samples, and σ denotes the sigmoid function.
Problem Statement. Suppose we have a graph G =
(V, E ,X) and a well-trained fGNN on G. In the testing
phase, fGNN is expected to perform good predictions on G
(e.g., transductive classification) and on other graphs with a
similar distribution of G (e.g., inductive classification). The
goal of an adversarial attack is to maliciously transform G to
a perturbed graph G′ = (V ′, E ′,X′) = P (G), such that the
performance of the original model fGNN on the perturbed
graph G′ drops dramatically.
In this work, we study the problem of adversarial defense
for GNN, that is to defend a GNN against the adversarial at-
tacks. More formally, given a graph G, our goal is to build
a robust GNN framework f (robust)GNN during the training phase,
such that in the testing phase, the robust model preserves its
good performance on the attacked G′.
3 The DefNet Framework
To address the two key challenges introduced in Section 1,
we propose an adversarial defense framework DefNet with
two modules: Graph Encoder Refining (GER) and Adversar-
ial Contrastive Learning (ACL) as illustrated in Fig. 1. In
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Figure 1: An overview of DefNet framework. DefNet contains two modules: Graph Encoder Refining (GER) and Adversarial Contrastive
Learning (ACL). The GER module polishes the encoder of GNN with mean intra-layer aggregation (i.e., AGGintra()), dense-connected
inter-layer aggregation (i.e., AGGinter()) and bottleneck perceptron (i.e., BPERCE()). The ACL module takes the benign graph samples
(e.g., G) and the adversarial graph samples (e.g., G′) as the input to train the refined GNN in a conditional GAN manner.
GER module, we aim to examine the vulnerabilities in every
layer of a GNN encoder, and propose corresponding strate-
gies to address these vulnerabilities. And in ACL module,
our goal is to train the GNN to be more distinguishable be-
tween real benign samples and adversarial samples.
3.1 GER: Graph Encoder Refining
Dual-Stage Aggregation
As the first layer of GNN, the aggregation layer leverages the
graph structure (i.e., the local context of each node) to im-
prove the GNN performance by aggregating neighbourhood.
However, due to graph properties such as homophily [Lon-
don and Getoor, 2014], the representation of a single node
can easily be affected by its local context. Consequently, at-
tackers can compromise a node’s prediction without directly
changing its features and/or edges [Zugner et al., 2018].
To improve the robustness of the aggregation layer, we pro-
pose a dual-stage aggregator. As shown in the middle of
Fig. 1, in the first stage, an intra-layer aggregation integrates
the neighbourhood in a mean pooling manner. In the second
stage, an inter-layer aggregation combines the node represen-
tations from multiple layers in a dense-connection manner.
The intra-layer aggregation aims to compute the new rep-
resentation of a node by aggregating its local neighbourhood
spatially. Typical neighbourhood aggregation operation in-
cludes sum [Xu et al., 2018], max [Hamilton et al., 2017a],
and mean [Kipf and Welling, 2016]. The sum aggregator
sums up the features within the neighbourhood Nv , which
captures the full neighbourhood. The max aggregator gen-
erates the aggregated representation by element-wise max-
pooling. It captures neither the exact structure nor the dis-
tribution of the neighbourhood Nv . The mean aggregator av-
erages individual element features out. Different from the
sum and max aggregators, it can capture the distribution of
the features in the neighbourhood Nv .
The adversarial attacks are usually stealthy and can only
perform small-scale modifications to the graph data. An
ideal aggregator should be robust to such subtle perturbations.
Among the three aggregators, the max aggregator is very
sensitive to the distinct modification (e.g., by adding a new
neighbor of a different class with a big value), even though it
is very small. For the sum aggregator, it can also be affected
by this kind of modification. In contrast, the mean aggrega-
tor is less sensitive to the small-scale modification and thus is
more robust to adversarial attacks.
Therefore, in our GER module, the intra-layer aggregation
AGGintra() aggregates the neighborhood in a mean pooling
manner. Formally, it is defined as follows:
aˆ(k)v = AGGintra({h(k−1)u : u ∈ Nv})) (7)
=
1
|Nv|
∑
u∈Nv
h(k−1)u (8)
where k is the index of layer/iteration, |Nv| is the cardinality
of the neighborhood of node v, and aˆ(k)v is the result of the
intra-layer aggregation.
In the second stage, the layer-wise aggregation is employed
to connect current layer of the network to its previous layers,
such that more structural information can be covered. Re-
cently, GNNs, such as GCN and GraphSAGE, leverage the
skip-connection to aggregate the representation from the pre-
decessor layer and drop the rest of intermediate representa-
tions during the information propagation within k-hop neigh-
bors. However, stacking multiple such layers could also prop-
agate the noisy or adversarial information from an exponen-
tially increasing number of expanded neighborhood member
[Kipf and Welling, 2016].
To address this problem, we propose a dense-connected
inter-layer aggregation, as inspired by the DenseNet [Huang
et al., 2017]. Our method keeps all intermediate represen-
tations and aggregates them together to compute the recent-
layer representation. In this way, the recent layer is connected
with all previous hidden layers, allowing the subsequent layer
to selectively but adaptively aggregate structure information
from different hops. Consequently, the robustness can be im-
proved for deep GNN.
Formally, the dense-connected inter-layer aggregation
AGGinter() is constructed as follows:
a(k)v = AGGinter(aˆ
k
v ,h
(k−1)
v ,h
(k−2)
v ...h
(1)
v ) (9)
= [aˆkv ;h
(k−1)
v ;h
(k−2)
v ; ...;h
(1)
v ] (10)
where [·; ·] represents the feature concatenation operation.
Bottleneck Perceptron
In this section, we propose the bottleneck perceptron for map-
ping the aggregated representation to node embedding in a
non-linearly low-dimensional space. Particularly, it consists
of a bottleneck mapping followed by a nonlinear mapping.
Recent researches have empirically studied the one-to-one
relationship between the adversarial vulnerability and the in-
put dimensionality, and theoretically proved that the adver-
sarial vulnerability of neural networks deteriorates as the in-
put dimensionality increases [Simon-Gabriel et al., 2018].
On the other hand, it is common that real data are not truly
high-dimensional [Levina and Bickel, 2005]. The data in a
high-dimensional space can be well embedded into a lower
dimensional space for both better effectiveness and efficiency.
Therefore, it is important to perform dimensionality reduction
on the input to improve the robustness of a GNN .
To this purpose, we design a bottleneck mapping, such that
the output dimensionality is much lower than that of the input.
Meanwhile, we add a nonlinear gating function to capture the
nonlinearity of the data. In particular, we use rectified linear
unit (ReLU) as the activation function. Formally, the bottle-
neck perceptron is defined as follows:
h(k)v = BPERCE(a
(k)
v ) = RELU((W
(k)
p )a
(k)
v ) (11)
where W(k)p is the trainable mapping matrix. The output of
this module is the low-dimensional node embedding.
3.2 ACL: Adversarial Contrastive Learning
After addressing the vulnerabilities of the graph encoder, the
GNN may still be vulnerable to the adversarial attacks due to
the scarcity of training data [Pinto et al., 2017]. To handle this
issue, in this section, we introduce the adversarial contrastive
learning to regularize the training of the GNN.
Contrastive learning has been widely found useful for rep-
resentation learning of graph data [Hamilton et al., 2017b].
Its objective is written by:
L = E(x+,y+,y−)[`w(x+, y+, y−)] (12)
where `w(x+, y+, y−) scores a positive tuple (x+, y+)
against a negative one (x+, y−), and E(x+,y+,y−) represents
the expectation w.r.t. the joint distribution over the positive
and negative samples. Since negative sampling is indepen-
dent of the positive label, Eq. 12 can be rewritten by:
L = Ep(x+)Ep(y+|x+)p(y−|x+)[`w(x+, y+, y−)] (13)
= Ep(x+)[Ep+(y|x)Dw(x, y)− Ep−(y|x)Dw(x, y)] (14)
where Dw(x, y) measures the correlation between x and y.
Traditional graph embedding methods adopt a noise con-
trastive estimation approach and approximate p(y−|x+) with
a noise distribution probability pn(y), such that
L = Ep(x+)[Ep(y+|x+)pn [`w(x
+, y+, y−)]] (15)
= Ep(x+)[Ep+(y|x)Dw(x, y)− EpnDw(x, y)] (16)
However, using pn sacrifices the performance of learning
as the negative samples are produced based on a noise dis-
tribution. What is worse, using pn also harms the robustness
of the learning as the negative samples are produced without
considering the adversarial samples.
To address this problem, we model the negative sampler
by a generator under a conditional distribution gθ(y|x). For-
mally, it is defined as follows:
L = Ep(x+)[Ep+(y|x)Dw(x, y)− Egθ(y|x)Dw(x, y)]. (17)
We optimize the above objective function in a minimax ad-
versarial learning manner as follows:
(18)
min
Gθ
max
Dw
{Ep+(y|x)[logDw(x, y)]
+ Egθ(x,y)[log(1−Dw(Gθ(x, y)))]}.
This formulation is closely related to GAN by regarding
Dw as the discriminator and Gθ as the generator. The gen-
erative model Gθ captures the data distribution, and the dis-
criminative modelDw estimates the probability that a sample
comes from the training data rather than Gθ. Gθ and Dw are
trained jointly: we adjust the parameters of Gθ to minimize
log(1 − Dw(Gθ(x, y))) and adjust the parameters of Dw to
minimize logDw(x, y), as if they follow the two-player min-
imax game.
However, the vanilla GAN does not take any constraint into
account for the generator, and the generator is not tailored to
the graph data. This may cause suboptimal quality of the gen-
erated adversarial samples since the adversarial latent space
can not be effectively explored. This limitation may reduce
the performance of the feature learning. To overcome it, we
adopt a conditional GAN configuration, which extends a con-
ditional model where the generator and discriminator are both
conditioned on some extra information. The extra informa-
tion could be any kind of auxiliary information, such as class
labels or data from other modalities.
The condition can be realized by feeding extra information
into both the discriminator and generator as an additional in-
put layer. As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the high-level
graph representation (e.g., graph embedding hG) as a global
constraint to regularize the node representation learning. The
motivation is based on the observation [Dai et al., 2018] that
global level representation such as graph embedding is less
sensitive to the adversarial perturbation than the local-level
representation such as node embedding. Thus, the global
graph representation can be used to guide the robust learning
of the local node representations. Accordingly, the objective
of our adversarial contrastive learning becomes:
(19)
min
G
max
D
{Ep+ [logDw(hv|hG)]
+ Egθ [log(1−Dw(Gθ(h′v|hG))))]}
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Cora
GCNm ax
GCNsum
GCNm ean = GCN
GraphSagem ax
GraphSagesum
GraphSagem ean = GraphSage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Cora
GCNnone
GCNskip = GCN
GCNdense
GraphSagenone
GraphSageskip = GraphSage
GraphSagedense
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Cora
GCNhigh
GCNm id
GCNlow
GraphSagehigh
GraphSagem id
GraphSagelow
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Citeseer
GCNm ax
GCNsum
GCNm ean = GCN
GraphSagem ax = GraphSage
GraphSagesum
GraphSagem ean
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Citeseer
GCNnone
GCNskip = GCN
GCNdense
GraphSagenone
GraphSageskip = GraphSage
GraphSagedense
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Citeseer
GCNhigh
GCNm id
GCNlow
GraphSagehigh
GraphSagem id
GraphSagelow
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Polblogs
GCNm ax
GCNsum
GCNm ean = GCN
GraphSagem ax = GraphSage
GraphSagesum
GraphSagem ean
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Polblogs
GCNnone
GCNskip = GCN
GCNdense
GraphSagenone
GraphSageskip = GraphSage
GraphSagedense
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Peturbations
− 1.0
− 0.8
− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
M
ar
gi
n
Polblogs
GCNhigh
GCNm id
GCNlow
GraphSagehigh
GraphSagem id
GraphSagelow
Figure 2: Evaluation of the GER.
where h′v is the node embedding from the generated adver-
sarial samples G′ = (V ′, E′, X ′) = P (G). Here, the per-
turbation function P (·) can be defined similarly to [Zugner et
al., 2018].
To obtain the graph embedding, we employ aREADOUT
function. Given the node representations {hv}v∈V of graph
G, the READOUT function performs a mean pooling fol-
lowed by a nonlinear mapping as follows:
hG = READOUT (h
(k)
v |v ∈ V) (20)
= σ(Wr(
1
N
N∑
i=1
hKi ))) (21)
where σ represents the sigmoid function, Wr represents a
trainable linear mapping matrix, andK denotes the total num-
ber of layers/iterations. This module follows the idea of using
the pooling function to compute the high-level global repre-
sentation in CNN. The reason of using a mean pooling is sim-
ilar to that of neighborhood aggregation, i.e., the representa-
tion generated by the mean operation is more stable and less
sensitive to the small-scale adversarial attacks.
For the discriminator, we employ a mutual information es-
timator to jointly model the local and global graph represen-
tations via a bilinear scoring function:
Dw(hv|hG) = I(hv,hG) = σ(hvWDhG) (22)
where I(hv,hG) represents the mutual information between
the node embedding and graph embedding. WD is a trainable
scoring matrix and σ denotes the sigmoid function.
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our proposed DefNet framework
on defending adversarial attacks.
4.1 Datasets
Table 1: The statistics of the datasets.
Dataset #Node #Edge #Feature #Class
Cora 2,810 7,981 1,433 (Categorical) 7
Citeseer 2,110 3,757 3,703 (Categorical) 3
PolBlogs 1,222 16,714 Identity feature 2
We use three benchmark datasets including two academic
networks (Cora and Citeseer) and a social network (PolBlogs)
for node classification tasks. Table 1 shows the statistics of
these datasets. We select the largest connected components in
each dataset for our experiments, and we split all the datasets
randomly into a labeled set (80%) and an unlabeled set (20%).
We then further divide the labeled set into a training set (50%)
and a validate set (50%).
4.2 Experiment Setup
Attack Models
We conduct three types of popular adversarial attacks:
• RAND (a random perturbation attack): Given the target
node, it randomly adds edges to the node that belongs to
a different class and/or deletes an edge that connected to
the node within the same class.
• FGSM (a gradient based attack) [Goodfellow et al.,
2015]): It generates adversarial examples based on the
sign of gradient.
• NETTACK (a state-of-the-art optimization based at-
tack [Zugner et al., 2018]): It generates adversarial per-
turbations by searching the perturbation space.
The attack procedure is similar to [Zugner et al., 2018]. We
select 200 nodes as the targets: 50 correctly classified nodes
with high confidence; 50 correctly classified nodes but with
low confidence; and 100 random nodes.
Comparing Methods
We evaluate our framework DefNet on two most popu-
lar GNN variants: GCN [Kipf and Welling, 2016] and
GraphSAGE [Hamilton et al., 2017a]. To evaluate the
GER module, we compare different versions of GCN and
GraphSAGE in terms of intra-layer aggregators (XXXmean,
XXXsum, XXXmax), inter-layer aggregators (XXXnone
(without inter-layer aggregator), XXXskip (skip based),
XXXdense (dense based)), and output dimensions (XXXlow,
XXXmid, XXXhigh) as discussed in Section 3. To evaluate
the ACL module, we use the refined GNN after GER (RGCN
or RGraphSage) as graph encoder, and consider their variants
in terms of adversarial learning methods: XXXNCL (noise
contrastive learning) and XXXACL (adversarial contrastive
learning).
Configuration
We repeat all the experiments over five different splits of la-
beled/unlabeled nodes to compute the average results. For
GNNs used in the experiments, we set the default number of
layers as 3, and the number of perceptron layers as 2. We
also adopt the Adam optimizer with an initial learning rate of
0.01, and decay the learning rate by 0.5 for every 50 epochs.
4.3 Evaluation of GER
In this experiment, we show the vulnerabilities of the GNN in
terms of its aggregation and perceptron components. We also
demonstrate the effectiveness of GER in addressing these
vulnerabilities.
We test the robustness of different methods under the most
powerful attack NETTACK with various adversarial perturba-
tions. We use the classification margin score s as the metric
for the classifier performance:
s = Z∗
v,cgtv
−maxc 6=cgtv Z∗v,c (23)
where Z∗
v,cgtv
is the predicted probability for the ground-truth
label, while maxc6=cgtv Z∗v,c is the incorrect prediction prob-
ability with the largest confidence. The larger s is, the higher
confidence the classifier has in making a correct prediction.
From the experimental results shown in Fig. 2, we can see
that the GCN and GraphSAGE with our proposed GER per-
form better than the original version and the ones using other
aggregation or perceptron methods.
We can also observe that: (1) The mean intra-aggregator
outperforms the sum and max ones; (2) The dense inter-
aggregator outperforms the case without the inter-aggregator
and the skip inter-aggregator; (3) The lower dimension of the
perceptron layer beats both the high and medium ones; (4)
Comparing GCN with GraphSAGE, the performance of the
latter one is less stable but sometimes performs better, due
to a max aggregator combined with the random neighbour-
hood sampling; and (5) It is also worth noticing that PolBlogs
is difficult to attack, since the average degree of the node is
high.
Table 2: Performance comparison under various attacks.
Data Defense Clean Attack modelsRAND FGSM NETATTACK
Cora
GCN 0.90 0.60 0.03 0.01
RGCN 0.88 0.73 0.18 0.15
RGCNNCL 0.85 0.80 0.42 0.38
RGCNACL 0.92 0.85 0.65 0.60
GraphSage 0.85 0.70 0.18 0.16
RGraphSage 0.88 0.78 0.25 0.22
RGraphSageRCL 0.84 0.82 0.48 0.42
RGraphSageACL 0.88 0.84 0.67 0.60
Citeseer
GCN 0.88 0.60 0.07 0.02
RGCN 0.90 0.72 0.20 0.16
RGCNNCL 0.86 0.79 0.52 0.45
RGCNACL 0.90 0.85 0.70 0.65
GraphSage 0.83 0.70 0.10 0.04
RGraphSage 0.86 0.80 0.22 0.18
RGraphSageRCL 0.82 0.82 0.50 0.48
RGraphSageACL 0.88 0.84 0.68 0.65
Polblogs
GCN 0.93 0.36 0.41 0.06
RGCN 0.95 0.40 0.50 0.18
RGCNNCL 0.87 0.65 0.58 0.52
RGCNACL 0.95 0.80 0.74 0.65
GraphSage 0.86 0.43 0.40 0.14
RGraphSage 0.90 0.60 0.48 0.20
RGraphSageRCL 0.82 0.68 0.59 0.55
RGraphSageACL 0.89 0.78 0.72 0.68
4.4 Evaluation of ACL Module and
DefNet Framework
In this experiment, we show the effectiveness of the proposed
ACL module and overall DefNet framework under various
attacks. To guarantee the powerfulness of the adversarial at-
tacks, we set the number of the perturbations as: np = dv+2
with dv to be the degree of the target node. We report the
fraction of the target nodes that get correctly classified as
accuracy. The results in Table 2 show that the proposed
ACL method outperforms all the baselines including the tra-
ditional training and noise contrastive learning in terms of
datasets, GNN variants, and attack models. We also observe
that the original GCN and GraphSAGE are both very venera-
ble to the attacks, but after applying our DefNet framework,
both of them become way more robust. For example, GCN
can achieve an accuracy of 0.90 without any attack on Cora
data, but the performance significantly drops to 0.03 under
the FGSM attack, while RGCNACL (i.e., GCN with DefNet)
can still achieve an accuracy of 0.65.
5 Related Work
5.1 Graph Neural Networks
In recent years, representation learning on graph data via
Graph Neural Network (GNN) [Defferrard et al., 2016;
Hamilton et al., 2017a; Kipf and Welling, 2016; Velick-
ovic et al., 2017; Li et al., 2015; Gilmer et al., 2017;
Xu et al., 2018] has attracted increasing interests. Many GNN
variants have been proposed to leverage the graph structure to
capture different proprieties. [Defferrard et al., 2016; Hamil-
ton et al., 2017a; Kipf and Welling, 2016; Li et al., 2015] fol-
lowed a neighbourhood aggregation scheme. [Gilmer et al.,
2017] leveraged the structure information via message pass-
ing operation. Their success is built on a supervised end-to-
end data-driven learning framework, which is vulnerable to
adversarial attacks.
5.2 Attack and Defense on GNNs
Recently, a few attempts have been made to study adversarial
attacks on GNNs. [Dai et al., 2018] proposed a non-target
evasion attack on node classification and graph classification.
A reinforcement learning method was used to learn the at-
tack policy that applies small-scale modification to the graph
structure. [Zugner et al., 2018] introduced a poisoning at-
tack on node classification. This work adopted a substitute
model attack and formulated the attack problem as a bi-level
optimization. Different from [Dai et al., 2018], it attacked
both the graph structure and node attributes. Furthermore, it
considered both direct attacks and influence attacks. How-
ever, there is still limited understanding on why GNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks and how to defense against
the adversarial attacks. This motivates our work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented DefNet, an adversarial defense
framework for improving the robustness of Graph Neural
Networks (GNNs) under adversarial attacks. To address the
vulnerabilities in the aggregation layer and perceptron layer
of GNN, we proposed the dual-stage aggregation and bottle-
neck perceptron methods. By leveraging the high-level graph
representation, we proposed the adversarial contrastive learn-
ing technique to train the GNN in a conditional GAN man-
ner. We evaluated the proposed framework using extensive
experiments on three public graph datasets. The experimen-
tal results convince us of the effectiveness of our framework
on defending the popular GNN variants against various types
of adversarial attacks.
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